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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PEKING

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SOVIET UNION

I. FEBRUARY 1973 TALKS

Chinese Position in February

- So long as the objectives are the same, we can work together to commonly deal with a bastard. (Mao)
- The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia. (Mao)
- If Russia attacks, China will let them go where they want and will fight a guerrilla war and protracted war. (Mao)
- The West has the idea of making peace with Russia and pushing Russia eastward -- against China, Japan, and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. (Mao)
- Europe and the US would think it a fine thing if Russia got bogged down in China. After 6 months or 1-2-3-4 years, the US can then poke its finger in the Soviet back, in the name of peace, as a way to bring the Soviet Union down. The US would help them in doing business and offer help against China. (Mao)
- China must think of the worst eventuality -- that they would attack China and be defeated. (Mao)
- The Europeans do not appreciate the menace of Soviet military preparations.
- The Soviet Union has its weak points. It is strong militarily but weak economically. If they use their military power, there will be no end. This will be a mess for them.
- The new Czars are extremely sly. The Brezhnev doctrine has its timid aspects, e.g. on nuclear weapons, but in other aspects they are extremely aggressive. As soon as you slack your steps, they will step in.

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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(Chinese position, cont'd)

- The Soviets are afraid of fighting a nuclear war, and they are even worried that conventional fighting might lead to nuclear war. That is why they have silly ideas like a nuclear treaty.
- To expose the deceptive nature of Soviet policy is a very complicated struggle. E.g., it is difficult to oppose Soviet non-use-of-force proposals. (In the UN, only Albania, China, Portugal and South Africa did. Many abstained. But 70 voted for it.)
- The US wants to reach out to the Soviets by standing on Chinese shoulders. The US thinks China is easy to talk to. E.g., sending Thieu 30 aircraft from Taiwan.
- Both world wars show historical examples of the West having the idea of pushing the aggressor eastward.
- US agreements with the USSR (e.g. Berlin) can be said to be consistent with the Soviet policy to lull or demoralize Western Europe.
- The Soviets want the nuclear agreement to deceive the people of the world; they want secret deals with the U.S. as a means to continue their competition with the U.S. and threaten areas they wish to threaten.
- The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty hasn't expired but it is non-existent. The Soviets seek a non-aggression treaty. This is absurd for allies, and neither sincere nor necessary. If they wanted to end the border conflicts, the first step would be to clarify the preliminary agreement on the border situation. This they won't do. Their motive is propaganda.
- The Soviet Union may have initiated the idea of having Waldheim attend the International Conference on Vietnam.
- The inevitable result of improving the Soviet economic position is to add to their military power. That is all they have thought about. How they realize it is another matter.

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(Chinese position, cont'd)

- It is not easy for the Soviet Union to achieve its goal [to surpass the US.] If they reach out their hands to the whole world, then they will be in the same position as the US before -- in a passive position. They want to gain the upper hand everywhere, but actually that is impossible for them.
- It is true that if the US thought China could be easily defeated [HAK's first case] there would have been no reason for the US to seek better relations with China. The second and third cases are two sides of one thing, because HAK too attached importance to the danger and to the need to prevent it.
- As Mao mentioned, China must be prepared for the worst. Therefore, China must "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."
- China must be prepared to withstand an attack for 1-2-3-4 -5 years, until the world understands and reproaches the USSR. China must be prepared so that the attacker will be able to enter but not come out.
- But it is best to prevent the event before it happens.

U. S. Position

- It is not our policy to push Russia to fight China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as that of a war in Europe. (to Mao)
- If Russia attacks China, we would certainly oppose them, for our own reasons. If Russia overruns China, this would leave all countries less secure and the US isolated. (to Mao)
- The US wants to discourage and prevent a Soviet attack, not defeat it. (to Mao)
- We both face the same danger. We may have to use different methods sometimes, but for the same objectives. Even if we sometimes criticize each other, the US will coordinate its actions

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(U. S. position, cont'd)

with China and will never participate in a policy to isolate China.
(to Mao)

- We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China. (to Mao)
- If a real danger exists or hegemonial intentions become active, we will resist them wherever they appear -- in our own interest, not as a kindness to anyone else. (to Mao)
- There is a strong community of interest that is operating immediately between us. (to Mao)
- There are certain factors pointing toward an era of peace (e. g. , possible tranquility in Southeast Asia), but in the long term there are countervailing factors: First, the intensive Soviet military buildup in all directions and in strategic and tactical weapons simultaneously; second, the intellectual confusion in Western Europe and Europe's weakness as a counterweight; a third problem area is Japan.
- Resisting a Soviet thrust eastward is politically and psychologically more difficult for us than resisting a thrust westward. But the consequences of not preventing a thrust eastward are equally dangerous for us.
- The intensive Soviet effort of military preparations -- not just in Siberia but in strategic forces pointed towards us -- can't be accounted for unless one assumes the option of their use is being prepared.
- It is too dangerous for the Soviets to attack Western Europe. They will try to create an atmosphere of peace to free themselves to move East or South.
- The Soviets do not like to take excessive risks.
- The Soviet Union has its weak points -- economically -- but this may give them an incentive to use their military machine while it is still so strong.

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(U. S. position, cont'd)

- The US is not standing on Chinese shoulders to reach out to the Soviets. Our shipments of arms to Thieu from Taiwan had nothing to do with the USSR.
- The Soviets have again proposed a Nuclear Agreement and want to sign it when Brezhnev comes to the US. But there is no possibility the US will agree to a treaty obligation not to use nuclear weapons. The only question is tactical--whether to reject it completely or evasively. We have considered a draft on creating conditions in which nuclear weapons would not be used, which would amount to a renunciation of force. This depends on our basic strategy.
- HAK's trip to Peking in July 1971 gave the Soviets an incentive to improve their relations with us. We had expected the opposite. The most probable Soviet motive is to demoralize Western Europe, exploit US technology to build up their power, isolate weaker opponents and ultimately isolate the US.
- The US strategy, because of our difficult domestic situation resulting from Vietnam, is to maneuver rather than have a frontal confrontation. When necessary (Cienfuegos, Jordan), we have reacted with extreme violence to direct Soviet challenges.
- We have had to rally our people by some conspicuous successes in foreign policy. We had to end the war in an honorable way. We want to modernize our strategic power. We want to maneuver the USSR into the position of provocateur. We have to get our people used to some new propositions about US interests. This is determined by our own necessities.
- The only agreements we reach with the USSR are ones that either cost us nothing (Berlin), are in a general interest (SALT), or are nonpolitical (exchanges).
- In this context, the nuclear treaty is to play for time without giving away anything of substance.
- Since SALT, we have greatly accelerated the qualitative improvement of our strategic forces. Our preparations for SALT led us to study our defense posture in particular detail.

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(U. S. position, cont'd)

- The collapse of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam would affect our ability to conduct any effective foreign policy. This is one reason the Soviets are moving into a position of undermining the Agreement. They are also trying to establish their position in Hanoi.
- Under no circumstances will we make any secret arrangements with the USSR. The PRC will be kept informed, and everything will be published.
- We will never accept that in case of a Soviet attack on Europe Soviet territory will be immune; that in case of war in the Middle East nuclear weapons cannot be used; or third, that it is possible to threaten the international balance without the risk of nuclear war.
- The Soviets want US technology to improve their economic position, not their military position. Though they also want to improve their military position.
- The lesson of two World Wars is that once a big war starts, its consequences are unpredictable. A country which encourages a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is likely to produce a disaster for itself. In both wars the Germans moved westward first.
- As for the US pushing the Soviets toward the East, there are three possible causes: (1) that we want the Soviets to defeat China, (2) that we want a stalemate that exhausts both, or (3) that we produce such a result by incompetence, by permitting such demoralization in the West that the Soviets feel free to attack.
- The first case would be a disaster for the US because a victorious USSR would attract Japan, Finlandize Europe, and isolate the US.
- As for the second case, the President believes a Sino-Soviet war would have cataclysmic effects regardless of the outcome, and very unpredictable consequences. The Soviets could break out in some other direction to escape their dilemma. Japanese and Indian actions could not be predicted. It would demonstrate US

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(U. S. position, cont'd)

impotence and irrelevance, or force the US into extremely complex decisions.

- So if a Sino-Soviet war occurs as a result of our action, it will be the result of misjudgment, not deliberate policy. A morally disarmed West could tempt them to act. This is a real danger.
- If they attack China, it is very probable that we would poke them in the back, as Mao suggested. Our aim is to develop our policy so that we can take such measures.
- The greatest danger is that the Soviet Union will become so frustrated that it will do something rash. Their nervousness about HAK's visit to China indicated they do not feel they are gaining ground.

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JAPAN

I. FEBRUARY TALKS

Chinese Position in February

- The U.S. should cooperate with Japan and Europe on fundamental matters. (Mao)
- When HAK passes through Japan he should perhaps talk a bit more with them. One day isn't very good for their face. (Mao)
- Japanese feelings toward the USSR are not very good. The Soviets grabbed Mongolia, half of Sinkiang, Manchukuo, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. It doesn't seem likely that Japan and the USSR will form closer political relations. (Mao)
- China would rather see Japan have better relations with the U.S. than closer relations with the Soviet Union. (Mao)
- We (the U.S. and PRC) can also do some work there. (Mao)
- The Japanese may want to grab something (economically) in Russia. (Mao)
- Maybe the U.S. plans to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers in order to intimidate Japan and Europe. (Mao)
- Ohira seems to have a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than other Japanese.
- China has not asked Japan for indemnity. It would add to the burden of the people. Only this way can we move from hostility to relaxation. (Mao)
- It will be more difficult to settle the hostility with Japan than with the U.S. (Mao)

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(Chinese Position - Continued)

- The Sino-U.S. trade situation is the opposite of the Sino-Japanese situation, because U.S. imports from China are much less than Chinese imports from the U.S. and U.S. imports from Japan.
- China's policy with Japan is to do things step by step. China does not exclude their contacts with others.
- Since liberation, China has never ceased exchanges with Japan, and has been able to increase understanding in areas of contact. In other areas, there is still quite a large amount of prejudice.
- In the case of a Sino-Soviet war, there may be countries from the east that would like to fish in troubled waters.
- Japan is at a crossroads. China is not in favor of Dulles' US-Japan Security Treaty. But proceeding from the present situation, China did not touch on that when it established relations with Japan.
- Japan's economic development will inevitably bring with it an ideology of military expansion. That is objective. The U.S. fattened up Japan at the beginning, in order to prevent what it saw as Communist expansion. The U.S. should not have let Japan expand economically so unrestrictedly. But that is an objective development that does not heed the will of man. The U.S. also gave aid, paid its own occupation expenses, and encouraged investment and technical knowhow -- to make a better impression on the Japanese people after the atom bomb.
- What Japan has now is only an attempting, an ambition, but they want to gain more independence out of this development. Like when a young man grows up, he wants more freedom.
- A spirit of restraint would be better, but Japan's economic base doesn't allow it to restrain itself; it will compel it to develop.
- The other Asian countries have learned their lesson about Japan, and fear it. The Japanese have enough self-criticism to know

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(Chinese Position - Continued)

that if they do not obey a spirit of restraint they will become "economic animals."

- There is a way out for them but they refuse to take it. That is why they are trying to expand their investments abroad, and why Siberia is so attractive to them.
- Japan was afraid China would oppose the Siberian projects, but China said it was for them to decide. A good thing that would come from U.S. - Japanese cooperation in Siberia is mutual restraint on each other. Opposing it might have had bad results.
- The U.S. should give consideration to trying to win over Japan. We should try to harness the trend and administer them into the best channels.
- China supports Japan's recovery of its northern islands. But the Soviets put up a ferocious front.
- It is difficult to blame Japan because they have to rely on foreign raw materials and foreign markets. And their present self-defense capacity is limited, and they would meet both domestic and international opposition if they tried to develop it.
- Japan should not be allowed to enter Korea. China has told its Korean friends that.
- China agrees that the U.S. and China should both influence Japan to develop good relations.

U.S. Position in February

- The U.S. will cooperate with Japan and Europe on all essential matters. (to Mao)
- It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations. The U.S. is prepared to exchange information with China on this. (to Mao)

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(U.S. Position - Continued)

- Japanese-Soviet relations are ambivalent. But the Japanese are tempted by the economic possibilities in Russia. (to Mao)
- We welcome the Japanese-Chinese relationship. (to Mao) We encouraged it.
- Our attitude to trade -- that it is for political, not commercial purposes -- is unlike the Japanese attitude.
- It is important that Japan be anchored with as many countries as possible that have peaceful intentions.
- The danger is that the very aggressive economic nationalism that now exists could in time become political nationalism and even military nationalism. If they pursue their economic policy so aggressively they could get sucked into arrangements in Siberia, the Mideast, and Southeast Asia that could affect their interests.
- In 1973, we will try to develop a common economic and military policy with our European allies, and have a Summit to develop a new Charter of our relations. We will ask Japan to participate in the economic aspects of this.
- We agree with Chou's analysis of the dangers. Why the U.S. didn't foresee the consequence of Japan's industrial growth is an interesting historical question. But the biggest danger is that if Japan is torn between too many conflicting pressures from too many sides, they will become more and more nationalistic. Therefore on our side we will not encourage them in an anti-Chinese direction. We should jointly encourage them to develop [good] relations.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THM:dfb
5 October 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE


Subj: Visit to the PRC

Henry,

In view of your forthcoming trip to the PRC I wanted to point out this intelligence item as a matter of possible interest:

The senior Hungarian on the ICCS, MAGEN SZUCS, stated on Saturday, 29 September, that the Soviets will not equip North Vietnam with necessary supplies to mount a new offensive providing the US does not build up GVN offensive capabilities. The Soviets are satisfied with the "status quo" in the Republic of Vietnam and do not want to jeopardize existing US/USSR relations. Local fighting will, most likely, continue.

He emphasized that continued stability in the Republic of Vietnam also depended on our ability to get similar assurances from the PRC. The Hungarians do not know what the PRC is now providing to North Vietnam.


T. H. MOORER

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BRIEFING PAPER

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LAOSI. Background and Developments Since February 1973

With the conclusion of the agreement between the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the Lao Patriotic Forces (LPF), Laos is not an issue between the U.S. and the PRC. Following the signing of the peace agreement on February 21, a cease-fire took hold rather quickly and the RLG and LPF have continued by and large to observe it. During the post-agreement period, negotiations on a Protocol continued at a slow pace until the end of July, when it appeared that agreement had been reached. At that time right-wing pressure on Souvanna forced the re-opening of several issues. Efforts by the American Embassy and the after-effects of an abortive coup on August 20 moved things back on track and on September 14 the Protocol to the agreement was signed by both sides. The Protocols are beginning to be implemented: both sides have named their representatives to the Joint Commission to Implement the Agreement (JCIA) and the first LPF troops and cadre have arrived in Vientiane to prepare for the neutralization of that city and Luang Prabang. The next most important steps will be the formation of the coalition government and the simultaneous start of the 60-day period for the withdrawal of "foreign troops."

Recently implementation of the Agreement has been obstructed -- at least temporarily -- by the LPF's refusal to convene the JCIA to establish procedures for monitoring LPF troop deployments to the capital. On October 18 the RLG suspended arrivals in Vientiane; however, on October 25 a compromise was reached, "informal" meetings of the JCIA have been held, and LPF arrivals have been scheduled beginning November 3.

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A. Military Situation

Since February 21, the RLG forces (FAR) and the LPF forces (LPA) have observed the ceasefire to a large degree. Reported incidents have averaged less than ten a week for the past several months, with virtually no casualties. The FAR, [redacted] number approximately 80,000, compared to 30,000 in the LPA. The FAR could probably cope with the LPA if the LPA did not have NVA support.

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North Vietnam has removed few, if any, of its forces so far (as of November 1) and we have no indications of intentions to do so in the near term. Intelligence estimates that a major road system of 300 miles through the Panhandle is under varying stages of construction and at the present rate could be completed by next spring. Infiltration continues from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam; more than 65,000 NVA troops have moved through the pipeline in the last nine months.

Although we have no clear indications of NVA intentions in Laos, the following may be considered a reasonable estimate. There are three types of NVA forces in Laos: combat units, transportation units, and advisors and technicians associated with the LPA. There are approximately 24,300 personnel in combat units, 32,300 in transportation and administrative units and an unknown number (but probably about 5,000) serving as advisors and technicians. The NVA may well remove most of the combat troops, since in most cases they would be capable of returning in 24-48 hours from North Vietnam to their present positions. Up to 50% of the transportation units could be moved from the Panhandle across the Annamite Chain to northern South Vietnam, where another road net is in use. We judge few if any of the technicians or advisors would leave their LPA units.

B. The Protocol

Summary of Provisions: The Protocol signed September 14, provides details for implementing primarily the military provisions of the February Agreement. The major provisions of the Agreement, such as

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the release of POWs and the withdrawal of all foreign troops within 60 days of the investiture of the new coalition government (PGNU), the cessation of military activity and the prohibition against aerial reconnaissance, are essentially only restated in the Protocol. The Protocol identifies 27 demarcation points between the two sides and establishes the means of neutralizing the two capitals, to be enforced by a Joint Police Force (JPF) of 1,000 from each side in Vientiane and 500 from each side in Luang Prabang. All RLG military are to be withdrawn from the two cities except for one battalion in Vientiane and two companies in Luang Prabang--the LPF will station troops in equal numbers in the two cities. With regard to POWs, the Protocol calls on both sides to report the number of those captured, indicating nationality, and a list of those who died in captivity (DIC) within 15-30 days of the signing of the Protocol. As of November 1, two weeks past the deadline, neither side has complied with this requirement to our knowledge. The details of implementation are to be directed by the Joint Commission to Implement the Agreement (JCIA).

The political provisions of the Protocol apportion the portfolios of the new PGNU between the two sides, giving Education, Defense, Interior, Finance and Public Health to the RLG, and Foreign Affairs, Public Works, National Economy, Information and Religious Affairs to the LPF. Posts and Telecommunications and Justice will be headed by "qualified persons" acceptable to both sides. The new PGNU, when formed, will work with the Joint National Political Council (JNPC) which is to be composed of 16 persons from each side and 10 "qualified persons."

Status of Implementation: The first groups of LPF to man the JCIA and the Joint Police Force have arrived in Vientiane, and Luang Prabang. The PRC has shown interest in these implementation activities, and provided airlift for the groups going to Luang Prabang. The LPF personnel have been working with their RLG counterparts, primarily in clearing up logistical and administrative problems created by the impending arrival of the LPF implementation teams.

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A controversy over monitoring of LPF arrivals by the JCIA has obstructed implementation of the Agreement since October 18. The Pathet Lao have sought to delay the workings of the JCIA until all their security and administrative personnel are safely ensconced in the capital cities. The JCIA has therefore been unable to monitor LPF arrivals and the RLG military have become gravely alarmed. On October 18 they persuaded Souvanna to halt further LPF arrivals until the JCIA meets to work out the requisite procedures. On October 25 the LPF reportedly agreed to a compromise, "informal" meetings of the JCIA have been held, and LPF arrivals are scheduled to recommence November 3.

Meanwhile, Pathet Lao sources in Vientiane have let it be known that establishment of the new coalition must await full neutralization of the capital cities. The PGNU therefore is not expected to be formed before late November at the earliest, and one Communist source has speculated that investiture could be delayed until year's end. In order to work out the method whereby Souvanna can obtain some sort of tacit approval of the Agreement and Protocol by the National Assembly (which the LPF does not recognize), he has obtained the consent of the King to extend the Assembly's current session until early November. If there is further delay beyond that time, Souvanna would have to reconvene the Assembly to get its approval. The JNPC has also not yet been formed.

As the ceasefire has taken hold, the US presence in Laos has been reduced. The remaining military elements of the Attache office, with the exception of those recognized by the RLG in the newly-established DAO, and the Thai SGUs fall in the category of "foreign troops" that must be withdrawn under the provisions of Agreement and Protocol. Recommendations on the phased withdrawal of these personnel have been submitted by the WSAG--from 17 to 10 battalions in the first 40-day period after investiture and the rest in the context of future NVA withdrawals mentioned below. Aerial reconnaissance by the US is continuing, in technical violation of the Agreement and Protocol. We have been in frequent contact with the LPF on the subject of MIAs and POWs, and have been assured repeatedly that the LPF

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will cooperate fully once the new PGNU has been formed. The LPF acknowledge they hold only one prisoner (civilian pilot Emmet Kay) and have cautioned that they may not be able to provide very much information on MIAs. We know of cases of Americans who were seen in captivity in Laos who have not been released, and we have told the LPF that we expect information on their fate.

With the formation of the JCIA and as the implementation of the capitals' neutralization and other provisions is proceeding, the role to be played by the ICC/Laos has become the subject of renewed interest.

The Commission has been relatively inactive in recent years, and the terms of the Lao Agreement and Protocol restrict it more than did the 1962 Geneva Accords. The ICC/Laos is now subordinate to the Lao JCIA, which can only act unanimously. While it is true that the JCIA could well hamstring the ICC/Laos, both Lao parties have assured Commission members that it has an independent role to play, and that they hope it can be helpful in implementing the settlement. LPF representatives on the JCIA are also lower-ranking than originally expected, and this may indicate a downplaying of the JCIA role.

India and Poland have indicated interest in the reactivation of the ICC/Laos, while Canada has taken a more cautious approach. Still smarting from their unhappy experience in Vietnam with the ICCS, the Canadians are concerned with the ambiguity of the Commission's role under the Agreement and Protocol. They are awaiting an official request from the Lao parties and a clearly-defined role for the Commission before making their final decision to participate. The ICC/Laos also needs financial as well as moral support from all the Geneva powers. The PRC has not contributed to the Commission for some years, but the Indian ICC Comptroller in Vientiane has told us that last June in Hanoi the PRC gave him assurances that they would contribute if the ICC is reactivated and its role expanded. Their assistance in providing airlift for the LPF contingent to Luang Prabang may be an indication that they would be willing to offer similar support to the ICC. Both Geneva Co-chairmen, UK and USSR, are making efforts to provide support for the ICC, and the USG provided an additional contribution of \$110,000 for the remainder of this calendar year.

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Both the Agreement and the Protocol stress that decisions in implementation and conducting the business of the new government must be made on the basis of unanimity. Although it has yet to be demonstrated how this will work, both the RLG and the LPF have demonstrated at least some willingness to compromise throughout the negotiations that have led to the present political settlement. If the same spirit of cooperation continues, prospects for the settlement holding are good. Souvanna was the key element in bringing the opposing Lao factions together and his continued presence and influence will strongly effect the outcome of the settlement. The most likely disruptive factors are the intentions of the DRV (discussed below) and renewed rightist opposition. On the latter, the USG has firmly stated to all interested parties its support for the Prime Minister and the negotiated settlement. While we cannot guarantee that no incidents will mar the peace in the future, this strong stand by the USG should go a long way in discouraging further rightist attempts to sabotage the Agreement.

C. DRV Policy

Given the DRV's historical strong interest in Laos, particularly mountainous eastern Laos which borders North Vietnam, and the dependence of the leading personalities of the LPF on the Lao Dong Party the North Vietnamese will almost certainly continue their strong efforts to achieve ascendancy in Laos. For these historical, political, and security reasons, Hanoi will continue to seek hegemony over Laos as a longer term goal and seek in the shorter term to diminish what it considers to be hostile foreign predominance in Lao affairs. These goals, however, do not preclude the possibility of removing of significant military forces from Laos for tactical purposes. Hanoi sees the Panhandle in southern Laos as a vital link in its chain of support to its apparatus in South Vietnam and whatever its tactical plan is for the rest of Laos, it will almost certainly maintain control of this area.

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D. PRC Views

Peking has publicly welcomed the Agreement, and, through its airlift assistance to the LPF implementation personnel and its stated intention to support a reactivated ICC/Laos, seems to have indicated that it will play a more active role in post-ceasefire Laos. In Vientiane there have been indications (such as the recent Chinese-hosted farewell party for the American ARMA) of increased PRC diplomatic activity. We do not know whether the PRC urged Hanoi and the LPF to conclude the Agreement with the RLG, but public statements made after the signing and during the visits of LPF delegations to Peking indicate Chinese support for the political settlement.

There are presently an estimated 29,000 Chinese working on and defending the road complex in northern Laos. While there are no firm indications of plans to bridge the Mekong, work is taking place on the airfield at Muong Sai and troop shelters are being built near Pak Beng. Portions of the road were evidently damaged during the rainy season, and it appears that some engineering troops may be withdrawn once the repair work is completed. Peking has remained silent regarding the ultimate disposition of the complex or the withdrawal of their personnel. However, now that the Protocol is signed, the PRC may realize that the continued presence of its construction personnel and anti-aircraft troops will appear increasingly anomalous, particularly if the DRV withdraws its forces. Peking's holding or extending the road will also hamper its efforts to improve its relations with Thailand--particularly since the roads substantially increase access from China to the Thai border. The Thai expressed their concern about the Chinese road to you when you visited Bangkok last February.

E. USSR Policy

The Soviet Union in Laos seeks to block the extension of PRC influence in Southeast Asia by enhancing the Soviet position with the RLG and the LPF, as well

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as the North Vietnamese. Within this context the Soviets probably see a return to stability in Laos in accordance with the Geneva Agreements as assisting in this purpose and are prepared to act to this end. The Soviets, for example, were of significant assistance in early September in getting the military components of the two Lao sides together to work out certain military problems in the draft Protocol.

II. Current Issues

While Laos is an important factor in the Indochina situation, it is not a significant point of contention between the US and the PRC. While you will be able to discuss Laos in the context of the similarity of our objectives, the discussion will also provide an opportunity to

- Impress on the PRC that we fully support the Laos Agreement and view its implementation as an important component of stability in Indochina.

- Gain an understanding of Chinese views regarding DRV intentions in Laos, with the objective of enlisting Chinese support on NVA troop withdrawals.

- Determine Chinese intentions concerning their road network in northern Laos.

- Encourage Chinese support for a revitalized ICC/Laos.

III. Talking Points

- Like you, we are gratified that the agreement was reached. I want to impress on how important this agreement is in the broader effort to achieve stability in Indochina. You know how hard we worked behind the scenes to support Souvanna Phouma in his efforts to conclude the agreement.

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-- We know that Souvanna Phouma wants to make the agreement work and he has our full support in this endeavor. Towards that same end, the US will do everything it should and can do.

-- We expect the LPF and Hanoi will also live up to the agreement. In this regard, we encourage you to use your influence with Hanoi to get it to remove its forces from Laos, as called for in both the agreement and the Protocol.

-- I would be very interested in your understanding of North Vietnamese intentions in Laos.

-- We will welcome your thoughts regarding anything either of us can do to improve the prospects for the agreement to lead to a permanent solution of the Laos problem.

-- I would like to suggest a specific contribution that I feel our two countries can make to stability in Laos. As a participant in the 1962 Geneva Conference, the PRC has an interest in seeing the ICC/Laos play a useful role in Laos. I understand that one of your representatives expressed your interest in a reactivated and expanded ICC/Laos to Indian representatives on the Commission. We welcome your support both in resources and in your influence on the parties concerned, and we welcome your thoughts on how the ICC/Laos can be made more useful in stabilizing the peace in Laos. I can assure you that the USG will support any efforts to make the ICC/Laos more effective.

-- Now that the Laos agreement has been raised what are your intentions with regard to your presence in Laos? As you know, once the new government is formed, all foreign forces are to be withdrawn within sixty days.

-- As you know, the Thai and many of the Lao, are concerned about your road construction in northern Laos. What are your intentions in this matter?

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Laos

Drafted: EA/LC:SBThomsen:BDPorter
10/13/73 X 21449

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Hummel
EA/PRCM - Mr. Armstrong
NSC - Mr. Stearman
NSC - Mr. Adams

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

November 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: Director Iklé's Memorandum Suggesting Arms
Control Issues for Possible Discussion in Peking

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Fred Iklé, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in which he suggests a number of issues you might wish to discuss with Chinese leaders during your Peking trip:

- He suggests the Chinese may be concerned about the "provocative attack" argument detailed in John Newhouse's study of Salt I (Cold Dawn), and that they might welcome your views on this issue.
- He details a number of issues related to Salt II -- the way we appear to have used our new relationship with Peking to gain arms control agreements with the Soviets, and the way that the "FBS" issue will influence Soviet deployments against them -- where you might clarify our position to them.
- He proposes that a "hot-line" arrangement with the PRC might be useful as a way of exchanging time-sensitive information about Soviet military actions directed against China, thus in effect enhancing their inadequate early warning system. He also suggests that we can make Skylab high resolution "earth resource survey satellite" photographs available to them through normal commercial channels (they are already purchasing low-resolution ERTS photographs) in order to heighten the accuracy of their targeting on Soviet sites -- thus increasing the effectiveness of their deterrent against the Russians.
- He suggests a number of non-proliferation activities where we might elicit tacit or even active PRC support.

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XGDS 5(b) BYAUTH Sec Kissinger

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This document consists of 4 pages.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

ACDA- 6383



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

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October 22, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Peking: Arms Control Aspects

For the sake of brevity, I am omitting the more obvious ideas, such as:

- explaining to the Chinese our approach to SALT and MBFR, and perhaps offering to keep them informed;
- suggesting technical discussions on nuclear weapons safety (in which Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua expressed some interest to visiting U.S. scholars);
- raising the possibility of conventional arms limitations for Korea.

Instead, let me briefly list some items that may be less obvious.

Chinese Concerns About SALT After Newhouse's Book

The publication of John Newhouse's book last spring might have influenced Chinese assessments of SALT, provided they regard John's account as fairly authentic. For example:

- Peking's intelligence specialists will have combed through the "provocative attack" part and compared it with related points that we

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--and perhaps the Russians--might have made to them separately. On this, for them, most sensitive aspect of SALT, they will presumably try to integrate all available sources.

- Newhouse's point that progress toward the Berlin agreement was influenced by your trip to Peking, plus his more general points regarding the effect of triangular politics on SALT, might strengthen a Chinese belief that we now need detente arrangements with them in order to cope with the seemingly stronger Soviet position in SALT II.
- The Newhouse book, in combination with the Congressional hearings on SALT I, will tend to portray our conceptual approach to SALT as centering on the Soviet disarming strike against the US, with no apparent concern for the Sino-Soviet strategic relationship. With this in mind, the Chinese might be worried as to how the "FBS" issue will be dealt with in SALT II: Will SALT II free Soviet military resources against China? Will Soviet IR/MRBMs and medium bombers be shifted from Europe to the Far East because of an "FBS" deal? Etc.

Given the continuing, serious impasse on FBS in SALT II, I would advise against committing ourselves further to our present FBS position in conversations with the Chinese.

Our Greater Knowledge About Soviet Forces

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Thus, we might pick-up warning of a Soviet surprise attack on China hours before the Chinese could (depending, of course, on how the Soviets prepared such an attack). And given that a large portion of the Chinese strategic forces will continue to consist of bombers, hours of advance warning could be used by them to reduce the vulnerability of their forces significantly. Yet, if it were a matter of hours only, ordinary communications channels would not permit us to convey such warning to them.

This possibility puts the old idea of a Peking-Washington hotline into a new light. As to whether or not you wish to stimulate Chinese interest in a hotline depends, of course, on broader considerations (such as its impact on Moscow). But if you should wish to raise the idea in Peking, the fact that the hotline might enable us to transmit warning of a possible Soviet attack could be a powerful argument. It seems to me, this trilateral argument would carry more weight in Peking than the traditional bilateral reason for a hotline: a device to manage crises or accidents between the two capitals it connects. Of course, the value of all this, for us and for them, would be to increase deterrence of an attack.

You are aware that the Chinese have bought up (through a cover) NASA "earth resource" photographs (ERTS) of Soviet regions adjacent to them. If they followed up by acquiring also the commercially available computer tapes, they could improve their current target information of the USSR. We have so far avoided taking Skylab pictures over these regions, but if we did, this would offer the Chinese pictures of at least 10 times the resolution available from ERTS on an open "commercial" basis.

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The question as to whether we want to strengthen China's deterrent against Russia, of course, depends on our overall concern regarding the Sino-Soviet relationship. But if we should some day wish to do so, we would surely want to avoid enhancing, at the same time, China's capability against us. The above measures (especially the hotline) would meet this requirement, whereas general technical assistance, such as facilitating Chinese acquisition of computer technology, would not.

China's Interest in Non-proliferation

It seems doubtful that the Chinese are sufficiently concerned about the Indian and a possible Japanese development of nuclear weapons to overcome their opposition to the nuclear test ban, or to make them openly support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But more tacit Chinese support for non-proliferation seems less unlikely. For example:

- Continued toleration IAEA safeguards of Taiwan's facilities even though Taiwan was expelled from the IAEA. (Taiwan representatives have recently sought to obtain a reactor fuel re-processing facility from the US; we continue to rebuff these efforts.)
- Discreet support for the 1975 review conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the preparations of which are now beginning in the UN and IAEA.
- A reconsideration, in the more distant future, of Peking's attitude towards the atmospheric test ban (which would, of course, be dependent on the possibility of US-Soviet agreement on a threshold ban or comprehensive ban).


Fred E. Ikle

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